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Sammendrag 
Denne artikkelen drøfter om økende lønnsforskjeller kan ha bidratt til å forklare økningen i 
inntektsandelene til de rikeste i Norge. Spørsmålet vi stiller er om det fortsatt er kapitaleierne 
som dominerer blant toppinntekts-mottakerne eller om vi er vitne til en fusjon mellom topp 
kapital og topp lønnsinntekter? For å besvare dette spørsmålet benytter vi detaljerte 
inntektsdata for årene 1995 og 2004/2005.     
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1. Introduction 
For classical economists, there was a straightforward relationship between the factor 
distribution of income and the distribution of income among persons. There were workers, 
capitalists and landlords as separate classes, receiving wages, profits and rent, respectively. 
Workers were assumed to be at the bottom of the ladder, and a rise in the wage share reduced 
inequality in the personal distribution. A rise in the share of investment income – combining 
profits and rent – increased inequality in the personal distribution. 
While this classical model gives a stylised view of the factor composition of incomes, strong 
elements of the class system remained at the beginning of the twentieth century in that top 
incomes were made up predominantly of investment income. Piketty and Saez (2007, Table 
5A.7) show that in the United States in 1916 the capital income share for the top 0.5 per cent 
was over 50 per cent, and that the share of earned income for the top 0.1 per cent was only 10 
per cent. As they observe, “top corporate executives at the beginning of the century were only 
a tiny minority within the top taxpayers” (2007, page 152). In the United Kingdom in 1911 
investment income made up 72.3 per cent of the income of those assessed to super-tax 
(Atkinson, 2007, page 109).1  
This has now changed. Over the twentieth century there was in the US a “dramatic evolution 
of the composition of top incomes” (Piketty and Saez, 2007, page 152). There has been a 
surge in top wage earnings, and the “working rich” are now to be found in the top income 
ranges, along with the top capital owners (“rentiers”) who populated the top 1 per cent in 
earlier times. According to Wolff and Zacharias (2009, page 108), “the two groups now 
appear to cohabitate the top end of the income distribution”. In France, Piketty and Saez 
(2003) found that the top capital incomes had not been able to recover from a succession of 
adverse shocks over the period 1914 to 1945; post-war progressive income and inheritance 
taxation prevented the re-establishment of large fortunes.  
Recent studies suggest a different evolution in the Nordic countries. Jäntti et al. (2010) 
concluded that “the main factor that has driven up the top 1 per cent income share in Finland 
after the mid-1990s is an unprecedented increase in the fraction of capital income”. In 
Sweden, Roine and Waldenström (2008) report that “between 1945 and 1978 the wage share 
at all levels of top incomes became more important . . . But in 2004 the pattern is back to that 
of 1945 in terms of the importance of capital, in particular when we include realized capital 
gains”. In a study of top income mobility in Norway, Aaberge, Atkinson and Modalsli (2013) 
                                                     
1 The super-tax was an additional income tax levied on top incomes introduced by the UK Government in 1909. A 
positive side-effect of its introduction from today’s perspective is that it provided information on total incomes 
which had previously not been available on a regular basis.  
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show that between 60 and 80 per cent of the richest 0.1 per cent had their main income from 
capital during the period 1993 - 2005, while an additional 20 per cent had their main income 
from self-employment. The tax reform of 2005, however, changed the composition of top 
income earners  - in 2005, 81 per cent of the top 0.1 per cent derived their largest income 
component from capital, down to 50 per cent in 2006 and a maximum for the post-reform 
period of 55 per cent in 2008. Self-employment income was largely unaffected, whereas wage 
shares rose. 
This paper further explores the changing composition of top incomes, by examining in greater 
depth the roles of earned (labour) and investment (capital) income in Norway. Not only will 
this two-way decomposition help link the changes in top shares to macro-economic 
developments (the changes in the wage share), but it will also aid our understanding of the 
wider social implications of distributional change. The substantial rise in top income shares 
that has taken place in many (but not all) advanced countries means that it is important to 
understand the underlying mechanisms. Can the change in the marginal distribution of 
earnings on its own explain the rise in top income shares? Or in terms of our earlier stylised 
example: Are top executives elbowing capital owners out of the top income group? If that is 
the case, then it is the distribution of earnings that should have first claim on our attention. 
But if those at the top are increasingly receiving income from both sources, then we have to 
pay greater attention to the ownership and transmission of wealth.  
To address these questions, we explore the changes in the wage-capital composition of top 
incomes employing copulas, a known method which however has not yet been applied to the 
problem at hand.2 Copulas are functions of ranks in marginal distributions that connect the 
bivariate distribution functions to the associated marginal distribution functions. This means 
that a two-way table showing the proportions with wage income below the u-quantile of the 
wage income distribution and capital income below the v-quantile of the capital income 
distribution for different values of u and v displays a copula. The two-way table reveals 
whether there is an over- or underrepresentation of people in the different cells of the table; 
i.e. whether there is positive association, negative association or independence between wage 
and capital income.  
In our application, we do not seek to estimate parametric copula functions, but rather to 
compare the degree of association, proposing a straightforward procedure for the 
implementation of non-parametric copula dominance criteria. First-degree copula dominance 
applies for non-intersecting copulas. When copulas intersect, the paper proposes to use 
                                                     
2  Atkinson and Lakner (2017), which has been developed in parallel, use copula to study the association between 
capital and labour incomes in the United States. 
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second-degree copula dominance, which is defined by the cumulative integrated copula 
function. However, even second-degree copula dominance might fail to provide rankings of 
copulas in empirical applications. Thus, summary measures might be helpful both for ranking 
purposes and for quantifying and comparing the degree of association between variables. The 
Spearman coefficient emerges as an attractive summary measure of association because it is 
found to be consistent with second-degree copula dominance. 
 The paper is structured as follows: Section 2 describes the data used for the empirical 
analysis, which are drawn from Norwegian tax returns in 1995 and 2004/2005, and discusses 
their advantages and limitations. In Section 3, we set out the analytical framework. Section 4 
presents evidence on the changing association of top labour and capital incomes in Norway 
between 1995 and 2004/5, and provides a breakdown of top income shares by gender and age 
group. Section 5 concludes.  
2. Data 
In our empirical analysis, we use tax return micro data from the administrative registers of 
Statistics Norway for the years between 1995 and 2005. The tax unit in Norway is the 
individual, and both labour and capital incomes are recorded in the data at the personal level.  
We define labour income as earnings, to which we add two-thirds of self-employment 
income. Capital income is defined as personal investment income derived from profits and 
rents as well as from interest received on government and other debt. The allocation of self-
employment income to labour and capital income in shares two-thirds and one-third 
respectively is arbitrary but does not seem unreasonable (e.g. see Johnson, 1954, and Gollin, 
2002). Appendix A.1 provides further results on the joint distribution of capital and self-
employment income and on the effects of dropping self-employment income from the 
analysis and looking at earnings and capital income only. 
In the first part of the paper, we aggregate labour and capital income across all household 
members and carry out the empirical analysis for household income. We include both single 
and multi-person households in the analysis without adjusting for household size. Our main 
results continue to hold, however, if we limit the sample to two-adult households. 
Observations with negative income from any of the three sources (labour, capital or self-
employment) are excluded. Again, however, our main results are robust to retaining 
observations with negative income from capital or self-employment in the sample.3 Later 
parts of the paper, where we present a decomposition of the results by gender and age group 
                                                     
3  2.9% of all observations have negative income from capital or self-employment.  
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(in Appendix A.2), are based directly on individuals’ tax records. For this analysis, we trim 
the sample by excluding below-25 year-olds.  
The data we use have several advantages: First, there is no attrition from the original sample 
due to refusal by participants to consent to data sharing. Second, our income data pertain to 
all individuals, and not only to jobs covered by social security or individuals who respond to 
income surveys. And third, most income components are third-party reported, with little 
measurement error and without any top or bottom coding. 
We are fully aware also of the limitations of using tax data, however: Income tax data 
generally do not adequately capture the full return to capital.4 Moreover, the extent of 
coverage has fallen over time as there has been erosion of capital income from the progressive 
income tax base.5 To address this issue, we rely on the existing estimates of Hicksian 
measures of capital income (Aaberge and Atkinson, 2010). As Norway introduced dividend 
taxation in 2006, capital incomes in 2005 are higher and distributed slightly differently than in 
previous years due to the fact that a large part of the top income earners adjusted their income 
through legal means such as for owner-managers of closely held firms to increase dividends 
in 2005 (the tax on dividends was to be increased in 2006 from 0 to 28 per cent). We 
therefore average results for 2004 and 2005 instead of using the year 2005 in our analysis. 
Again, all results are robust, however, to using either 2004 or 2005 only.  
3. Analytical framework 
We are concerned with the decomposition of total personal income into two components: 
earned (labour) income and investment (capital) income. With this two-way division, the 
personal distribution of total income depends on three factors: 
a) The marginal distribution of earned incomes; 
b) The marginal distribution of capital incomes; 
c) The association between earned and capital incomes. 
The developments in top shares described earlier have highlighted these elements. In the US 
context, for instance, it would be natural to suppose that a substantial fraction of the rise in 
                                                     
4  For the United States, Piketty, Saez and Zucman (2018) attempt to provide a more complete estimate of capital 
incomes which includes undistributed corporate profits.  
5  At the outset, a number of income tax systems (such as those of France or the UK) included imputed rents of 
homeowners in the tax base, but today imputed rents are typically excluded (Spain being one exception). Where 
the tax base has been extended, this has in some cases taken the form of separate taxation (as with capital gains 
in the UK), so that the income is not covered in the income tax data. As a result of these developments, the share 
of capital income that is reportable on income tax returns, and hence included in the series presented, has 
significantly decreased over time. 
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top incomes was due to a surge in top wage incomes (factor (a)). The decline of the rentier 
also reflects reduced concentration of wealth (factor (b)). The simultaneous distribution of 
earnings and capital income has moved in ways that has increased the association between 
earnings and capital income among top income earners.  
In contrast to the elements (a) and (b), the third factor – the pattern of association – has 
received very little attention.6 Yet it is potentially important. The observed change in the 
composition of the top income group may also result from changes in the association between 
earnings and capital income. There may no longer be a sharp distinction between workers and 
rentiers (capitalists). In the pure class model, the association (correlation) between labour and 
capital income is minus 1. The association is now obviously greater than this, and may even 
be positive. 
It is therefore tempting to measure the third element in terms of the association. The Pearson 
correlation coefficient, defined by the ratio of the covariance between the two variables and 
the product of their standard deviations, is not however well-suited for this purpose, since it is 
not independent of changes in the marginal distributions. Suppose, for example, in the class 
model, workers are divided into two sub-classes, with the same mean wage, but with one 
class earning β times as much as the other. An increase in β means that the correlation 
coefficient between wage and capital income moves away from minus 1, but there is no 
change in rankings or in the composition of the top income group. This objection does not 
apply to the rank-dependent association measures. In this paper, we therefore consider the 
cross-association in terms of the copula function, which provides a non-parametric approach 
of isolating changes in association independent of changes in the marginal distribution. 
Proceeding more formally, let us denote labour income by x and capital income by y. The 
marginal distributions of, respectively, earned income and capital income are denoted by F  
and G . Since we are interested in the top incomes, we consider the survival distributions 
( ) 1 ( )F x F x= − , the proportion of the population with earned income of x or higher, and 
( ) 1 ( )G y G y= − , the proportion with capital income of y or higher. The joint distribution of x 
and y is denoted by ( , )H x y , and the joint survival function by ( , )H x y . Note that 
( , ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( , )H x y F x G y H x y= − − + .   
The copula is the function that binds together the two marginal distributions and is defined by 
, where  and  are the left inverses of F and G.  Or 
rather, since our purpose is to study the top shares, it seems better to use the survival copula 
                                                     
6  See Aaberge et al. (2000), García-Peñalosa and Orgiazzi (2013) and Milanovic (2017) for a discussion of similar 
issues, based on a factor income decomposition of either the Gini coefficient or the coefficient of variation. 
1 1( , ) ( ( ), ( ))C u v H F u G v− −= 1( )F u− 1( )G v−
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 associated with H (see Nelsen, 2006, pages 32-33). This shows the proportion of the 
population whose rank is u or higher in terms of labour income and v or higher in terms of 
capital income. Note that the survival copula is defined by  
(1) 1 1( , ) ( ( ), ( ))C u v H F u G v− −=   ,   
where  and  are the left inverses of  and . In other words, we can obtain 
the survival copula from the survival function by substituting  and . It should 
be noted that the copula is invariant with respect to strictly increasing transformations of these 
functions, which makes copula-based measures of association insensitive to the tail properties 
of the marginal distributions. Note that we have the following convenient relationship 
between the copula and the survival copula,      
(2)                                            ( , ) 1 (1 ,1 )C u v u v C u v= + − + − − ,  
and thus that .The properties of the copula function are described 
clearly by Dardanoni and Lambert (2001) in their analysis of the measurement of horizontal 
equity.  
The attraction of the copula is that it allows us to separate cleanly the changes in the relative 
rankings of individuals from changes in the marginal distributions. Suppose that there is a 
shift away from capital income towards labour income, in such a way that all capital income 
components are reduced proportionately, and all labour incomes are increased 
proportionately. This leaves the ranks in each dimension unchanged. The copula function is 
therefore unchanged.  
3.1. Partial orderings   
First-degree copula dominance 
The implementation of the copula may proceed parametrically or non-parametrically. 
However, since parametric specifications impose considerable structure on the joint 
distribution, it appears more attractive to proceed non-parametrically when empirical analyses 
rely on large number of observations.7 One advantage is that such an approach is closer to 
that adopted in studies of social mobility, where a distinction is drawn between structural 
mobility and exchange mobility (holding the marginal distributions constant). Exchange 
mobility is studied directly in terms of transition matrices [pij] where the cells are defined in 
                                                     
7  See Bonhomme and Robin (2006, 2009) and Jäntti, Sierminska and Van Kerm (2015) for applications of the 
Placket parametric family of copulas in cases where samples of observations form the informational basis. 
Arellano and Bonhomme (2017) use a more flexible parametric copula as a basis for correcting quantile 
regression estimation of wage distributions for sample selection.   
( , )C u v
1( )F u− 1( )G v− F G
1( )F u− 1( )G v−
(0.5,0.5) (0.5,0.5)C C=
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terms of percentile position. The counterpart of such a matrix in the present application – the 
association matrix – is illustrated in Table 1 for Norway in 2004/5. The table shows for 
example that 0.07 per cent of households were in the top 0.5 per cent of both wages and 
capital incomes. In other words, 14 per cent of households in the top 0.5 per cent of wages 
were also in the top 0.5 per cent of capital incomes. Of the households in the top 0.5 per cent 
of wages, 44 per cent were in the top 5 per cent of the capital distribution; whereas only 32 
per cent of the top 0.5 per cent of capital incomes was in the top 5 per cent of wages. This 
underlines the need to allow for asymmetry.  
This result can be illustrated more plastically in graphical form. Figure 1 shows the 
simultaneous density of capital and wage income for Norway in 2004/5, once for the top 
halves of the two distributions and once for the top 5 per cent only. The area of each circle is 
proportional to the frequency of observations in that specific cell. Shaded circles indicate cells 
in which households are overrepresented relative to the case of a uniform distribution of 
households across cells; blank circles give those in which households are underrepresented.8  
Figure 1. Normalised simultaneous density of capital and wage income, 2004/5 
 Panel A: The top halves of both distributions Panel B: The top 5 per cent of both distributions 
  
Note: The area of each circle is proportional to the frequency of observations in the specific cell. Shaded circles indicate 
cells in which households are overrepresented; blank circles give those in which households are underrepresented. 
 
There is an overrepresentation of households among the top 15 per cent of wage income 
earners (across the top half of capital income receivers) and a strong concentration in the top 
5 per cent of both marginals (Panel A). Within the top 5 per cent, the pattern is particularly 
pronounced in top 2 to 3 per cent of capital and wage income earners (Panel B), and 
somewhat stronger among top capital than among top wage income earners.  
                                                     
8  The circles’ areas have been calculated as (percentage of observations in the given cell) - (1 / the number of 
cells). Cells with negative values, in which households are underrepresented relative to the case of a uniform 
distribution of households across cells, are shown as blank.  
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We are interested in how far societies have moved from having a negative diagonal pattern to 
the transition matrix, as with the class society, to a situation where the two sources of income 
are independent or positively associated. In order to assess such a movement, it is helpful to 
move from the frequencies to the cumulative distribution, as with the survival copula . 
The survival function is shown in Table 2. This shows, for example, that nearly all of the top 
0.5 per cent of the wage distribution (92%) were in the top half of the distribution by capital 
income, whereas over 20 per cent of the top 0.5 per cent of the capital income distribution 
were in the bottom half of the distribution by wage income. Such a cumulative distribution 
can be used to compare the degree of diagonality. If we define a diagonalizing switch as one 
that adds and subtracts δ from adjacent cells in the frequency matrix [pij]: 
(3)    pi,j + δ  pi,j+1 – δ 
 pi+1,j – δ  pi+1,j+1 +δ    
(where i denotes the i-th percentile group, where i is counted from the top). The effect of the 
diagonalizing switch is to raise the survival copula by δ at (i+1,j+1) and to leave it elsewhere 
unchanged (in particular, the marginal distributions are unchanged) - see Atkinson (1981) and 
Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982). On this basis, one distribution is closer to a positive 
diagonal (further from a class distribution) if its survival copula is everywhere higher or no 
lower. If, as we do below, we compare Table 2 for 2004/5 with the same table for earlier 
years, then this provides a simple dominance test as to the effect of the third factor: the 
changing degree of association between incomes from different sources. 
More formally speaking, the standard ranking criterion of non-intersecting copulas, called 
first-degree copula dominance, is based on the following definition:  
 
Definition 3.1. A copula C1 is said to first-degree dominate a copula C2 if 
 [ ]1 2( , ) ( , ) , 0,1C u v C u v for all u v≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some , 0,1 .u v∈  
 
Note that first-degree copula and survival copula dominance orderings are equivalent, which 
follows straightforward from equation (2).9 However, as demonstrated by Decancq (2014), 
this is not the case for multivariate copulas of dimension higher than two. And similarly as the 
Pigou-Dalton principle of transfers can be used to justify the criterion of first-degree Lorenz 
                                                     
9  First-order copula dominance is also referred to as “concordance ordering” of copulas in the literature (see 
Nelson (2006), Definition 2.8.1). 
( , )C u v
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dominance, the principle of correlation-increasing transfers introduced by Boland and 
Proschan (1988) can be used to justify the criterion of first-degree copula dominance.10 Note 
that the correlation-increasing rearrangement relies on the condition of fixed marginal 
distributions.     
Second-degree copula dominance 
The test just described is one for first-degree dominance, and there may be situations in which 
this does not allow matrices to be ranked. When we compare the survival copulas for two 
years, we may find that there are both positive and negative differences. As with one 
dimensional inequality measurement, the dominance criteria can be extended to second and 
higher degrees. In the inequality measurement case, the second-degree condition is obtained 
by integrating the cumulative distribution or the inverse cumulative distribution, which leads 
to a readily implementable test in terms of comparing Lorenz curves. In the present case, the 
second-degree dominance condition can be obtained by integrating the copula function, and 
this leads to a readily implementable test in terms of comparing rank correlations.  
To deal with cases where there are both positive and negative differences between two 
copulas, we hence employ a criterion weaker than first-degree dominance comparing the 
upwards-cumulative integrated copulas. This is parallel to the concept, in one dimension, of 
second-degree upwards Lorenz dominance in Aaberge (2009).  
Definition 3.2. A copula C1 is said to second-degree dominate a copula C2 if   
(4) [ ]2
0 0
v u v u
1
0 0
C (s,t)dsdt C (s,t)dsdt for all u,v 0,1≥ ∈∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
and the inequality holds strictly for some ( ]0 1u,v ,∈ . 
 
It follows from equation (2) that  
(5)   
1 1
1 1 0 0
( , ) (2 ) ( , )
2
v u
v u
uvC s t dsdt u v C s t dsdt
− −
= − − +∫ ∫ ∫ ∫ , 
which means that second-degree copula and survival copula dominance are equivalent 
ranking criteria, and can be considered as a parallel to first-degree upwards and downwards 
Lorenz dominance. Note however that second-degree upwards and downwards Lorenz 
dominance are different ranking criteria (see Aaberge, 2009). 
                                                     
10  See also Tchen’s (1980) discussion of positive association (or concordance) for bivariate probability measures 
and Decancq (2012, 2014) for a generalization of these principles and an analysis of their links to stochastic 
dominance. 
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First and second-degree partial copula dominance 
Although analyses of copulas will normally be concerned with the entire bivariate distribution 
of two variables it might be of particular interest to focus on specific parts of the copula; e.g. 
comparing copulas for a specific value of u or v. To deal with such cases (see Figure 2 in 
Section 4) we introduce the following definitions of partial copula dominance: 
 
Definition 3.3. Let [ ], , , 0,1u u v v ∈  where u u<  and v v< . A copula C1 is said to first-
degree partial dominate a copula C2 if 
 [ ]1 2( , ) ( , ) ,C u v C u v for all u u u≥ ∈  
and the inequality holds strictly for some [ ],u u u∈ , 
or  
 [ ]1 2( , ) ( , ) ,C u v C u v for all v v v≥ ∈   
and the inequality holds strictly for some [ ], .v v v∈  
 
 Definition 3.4. Let [ ], , , 0,1u u v v ∈  where u u<  and v v< . A copula C1 is said to second-
degree partial dominate a copula C2 if   
 [ ]2
0 0
,
v u v u
1
0 0
C (s,t)dsdt C (s,t)dsdt for all u u u≥ ∈∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
and the inequality holds strictly for some [ ],u u u∈ , 
or 
[ ]2
0 0
,
v u v u
1
0 0
C (s,t)dsdt C (s,t)dsdt for all v v v≥ ∈∫ ∫ ∫ ∫  
and the inequality hold strictly for some [ ],v v v∈ . 
3.2. A complete ordering 
To achieve rankings of intersecting (survival) copulas (or cumulative distribution functions) 
there are two possible strategies. As just discussed, one is to use weaker partial orderings than 
first-degree copula dominance, where second-degree dominance emerges as an appropriate 
alternative. The other alternative is to apply summary measures of association, which provide 
14 
complete orderings and offer a method for quantifying the degree of association between 
random variables. As is noted by Nelsen (2006, page 170), we may integrate H(x,y) over (x,y), 
which leads to the Pearson correlation coefficient (see Schweizer and Wolff, 1981, page 
879).11 This measure has however already been rejected on the grounds that it is not 
independent of changes in the marginal distributions and only is valid for distributions with 
finite second-order moments. By contrast, these attractive features are captured by 
Spearman’s association measure12, which is defined by 
(6)
( )( ) ( )( ){ }1 2 1 3 1 2 1 33 Pr 0 Pr 0
12 ( , ) 3,
C X X Y Y X X Y Y
C u v dudv
ρ =  − − >  −  − − <  =   
−∫∫
 
where 1 1( , )X Y , 2 2( , )X Y  and 3 3( , )X Y are independent random vectors with distribution H. 
The standard definition of the Spearman coefficient is given by the former expression of Cρ , 
while the latter expression provides the copula version. From expressions (5) and (6) we get 
that CCρ ρ= , which means that the Spearman coefficient either can be defined as a 
functional of the copula or the survival copula. Note that [ ]1,1Cρ ∈ −  and 0Cρ =  when  the 
bivariate variables are independent. Expression (6) shows that Spearmans’s Cρ  has a 
similarly relationship to the copula as the Gini coefficient has to the Lorenz curve; Cρ  is a 
linear transformation of the volume between the copula and the unit square. As demonstrated 
by Proposition 3.1 Spearman’s association measure is consistent with second-degree copula 
dominance.13 
 
 
Proposition 3.1. Let C1 and C2 be copulas. Then  
 (i) C1 second-degree upward dominates C2 
implies 
 (ii) 
1 2C C
ρ ρ> . 
 
By applying Definition 3.2, Proposition 3.1 follows directly from the latter expression of Cρ
defined by (6).   
 
                                                     
11  Use of the incomplete covariance is discussed in Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982, Section 4). 
12  See Decancq (2014) for a generalization of Spearman’s bivariate association measure to multivariate 
distributions. 
13  Note that Kendal’s measure of association is not consistent with second-degree copula dominance. 
15 
4. Empirical results 
4.1. The association of top labour and capital incomes in 2004/5 
We have already shown the association matrix for Norway in the year 2004/5 in Table 1 and 
Figure 1. The degree of association appears strong. If we sum the entries for the top two 
groups, to look at the top 1 per cent, then nearly half (43 per cent) of the top 1 per cent of 
capital income recipients find themselves in the top tenth of earners – see also the graphical 
representation in Figure 2. 16 per cent of these taxpayers are in the top 1 per cent for both. 
Also, as noted earlier, the matrix is slightly asymmetric: The share of top 1 per cent wage 
income recipients who find themselves in the top parts of capital income distribution is 
always a little larger than vice versa – the sold black line in Panel A of Figure 2 lies slightly 
above that in Panel B. Put the other way round, only 9 per cent of those in the top 1 per cent 
of wage earners find themselves in the bottom half of the capital income distribution. Being 
well paid seems to almost guarantee being well placed in terms of capital income. In contrast, 
21 per cent of those in the top 1 per cent of capital income are located in the bottom half of 
the wage income distribution. One in five is close to being old-style capitalists. There is a 
positive association, but Norway in 2004/5 is far from complete alignment of wage and 
capital incomes.  
Figure 2. Changes in the conditional survival function of top earned income for various groups of top capital 
income receivers (and vice versa), 2004/5 vs. 1995 
 Panel A: Top 1 and 10 per cent of wage earners  Panel B: Top 1 and 10 per cent of capital income receivers 
 
Note: Panel A: Of those in the top 1 per cent of wage income, 63 per cent were in the top 20 per cent of earned 
income in 2004/5 (compared to 58 per cent in 1995). Of those in the top 10 per cent, the respective shares were 40 
per cent and 35 per cent. Panel B: Of those in the top 1 per cent of capital income, 58 per cent were in the top 20 
per cent of earned income in 2004/5 (compared to 69 per cent in 1995). Of those in the top 10 per cent, the 
respective shares were 40 per cent and 37 per cent. 
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4.2. Changing association patterns: 1995 to 2004/5 
How has the extent of association changed over time? There is no unambiguous trend. A 
comparison of the survival copulas for top wage earners and capital income receivers shows, 
overall, a slightly rising association in the top halves of the two distributions. The opposite 
pattern can however be observed in the very top, notably among the top 1 per cent of capital 
income receivers.  
Indeed, Figure 2, which also gives the relationship for 1995, shows that for the top 1 per cent 
of capital income earners (Panel B), the dashed black line for 1995 lies always well above the 
solid black one for 2004/5. In other words, the top-half segment of the 1995 copula for the top 
1 per cent capital income receivers first-degree dominates the corresponding segment of the 
2004/5 copula. The degree of association in this group hence declined substantially between 
1995 and 2004/5: for instance, the proportion of the top 1 per cent of capital income receivers 
who were in the top 10 per cent of wage earners fell from 58 per cent to 43 per cent. For the 
top 10 per cent capital income receivers, the top-half segment of the 2004/5 copula first-
degree dominates the corresponding 1995 copula segment – the solid blue line lies above the 
dashed blue line – though by a much narrower margin.  
No similar trend can be observed for the top wage earners: the dashed and the solid black 
lines in Panel A cross, as the line for 2004/5 is steeper than that for 1995, and blue lines for 
the top 10 per cent follow the same pattern. The association between top wage and capital 
incomes hence rose except for the very top of capital income receivers. The criterion of first-
degree partial copula dominance does neither apply for the top 1 per cent nor for the top 10 
per cent wage income earners. We do however find that the top-half segment of the 2004/5 
copula for both the top 1 per cent and the top 10 per cent wage earners second-degree 
dominates the corresponding segments for the 1995 copula. 
This pattern of a strengthening association between labour and capital incomes can also be 
observed for the remainder of the upper half of the two distributions. Table 3 shows the 
difference between the survival matrix in 2004/5 and that in 1995, where a positive entry 
implies that the (inverse) cumulative distribution is greater in 2004/5 than in 1995. We 
observe that outside the top 1 per cent of capital income receivers, all entries except one (they 
shaded cell) are positive. The shaded entries however imply that we do not have first-degree 
dominance, but we find that 2004/5 copula second-degree dominates the 1995 copula14. This 
is also reflected by the Spearman coefficient, which increases by 40 per cent from 0.169 in 
1995 to 0.236 in 2004/5. A decomposition of the Spearman coefficient into four segments, 
                                                     
14  Atkinson and Lakner (2017) show that the trend towards greater association is significantly stronger in the 
United States and more pronounced over the longer run. 
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where the median wage income and median capital income define the dividing lines, is 
displayed in Table 4. Note that each segment consists of 25 per cent of the population when 
wage and capital income are independent variables. Table 4 shows that the upper half – upper 
half segment provides the largest contribution to the positive overall Spearman coefficient, 
whereas the lower half – upper half and the upper half – lower half segments display negative 
association between wage and capital income. The positive contribution from both the lower 
half – lower half segment and upper half – upper half segment has increased significantly 
from 1995 to 2004/5.  
4.3. Does household size matter? Results for two-adult households 
We have so far considered the joint distribution of capital and labour incomes for the entire 
household population without accounting for household size and type. Household 
composition may be an important determinant of this joint distribution, however: larger 
households tend to have higher incomes from both labour and capital, and couples make 
different labour supply and investment decisions than singles.  
In spite of this, the findings just presented continue to hold if we focus on a population that is 
homogenous in terms of household composition. When breaking down our analysis by 
household type, we observe that two-adult households find themselves more often in the 
upper half of the wage and capital income distributions than persons living in other types of 
households (not shown).15 This is what we would expect given that resources in a two-adult 
household are pooled. Our main results remain largely unaffected, however: The survival 
function for capital and labour income in the income distribution of two-adult households 
looks very similar to that for all households in the overall income distribution. For instance, 
26.1 per cent of taxpayers were in the top 50 per cent of both wages and capital incomes in 
the income distribution of two-adult households in 2004/5 (Table 5) compared to 27.6 per 
cent of taxpayers in the overall income distribution (Table 2). The shares in the top 10 per 
cent of wage and capital income are 2.2 per cent in the income distribution of two-adult 
households and 2.4 per cent in the overall distribution.  
Also the time trend in the association of top capital and wage income is similar for the income 
distribution of two-adult households as for the overall income distribution. The association 
between top wage and capital incomes has grown over the observation period, as illustrated 
by the positive differences between the 2004/5 and the 1995 survival functions for two-adult 
households (Table 6). As in the overall population, it however weakened in the top 1 to 1.5 
per cent of the capital income receivers, as indicated by the shaded cells. Differences in 
                                                     
15  29 per cent of two-person households were in the upper halves of the wage and capital income distributions for 
the overall population in 2004/5 compared to only 20 per cent of other households.  
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household size and changes in the household composition during the observation period 
hence do not heavily affect our results. As suggested by Table 6 we find that the 2004/5 
copula second-degree dominates the 1995 copula, which is also confirmed by a 15 per cent 
increase in the Spearman coefficient; from 0.136 in 1995 to 0.156 in 2004/5. A similar 
decomposition as for all households is provided by Table 7. The results of Table 7 are roughly 
similar to those displayed in Table 4, where the lower half – lower half and upper half – upper 
half segments provide positive contributions and the lower half – upper half and upper half – 
lower half segments provide negative contributions.    
4.4. The decomposition by gender 
An obvious question to consider is whether there is a significant gender differential in the 
joint distribution of top labour and capital incomes. Men and women may differ in the 
frequency with which they find themselves in the top parts of the labour and capital income 
distributions because of earnings differentials and differences in investment decisions16. Also 
the strength of the association between the two income sources may vary between men and 
women. To be able to provide evidence on this issue, we abandon our earlier approach of 
aggregating incomes at the household level in favour of studying the distribution of earnings 
and capital incomes of individual persons. Any gender differences in the distribution of 
earnings and capital income that we find in our empirical analysis hence result from gender 
differences across single-person households as well as within-household gender differences in 
the distribution of earnings and capital incomes for multi-person households.  
Figure 3 again shows the simultaneous density of capital and wage income for the top halves 
and the top 5 per cent of the distributions. This time, we have however broken down our 
population by gender depicting the position of men and women in the overall distribution 
separately. Each circle’s area is again proportional to the frequency of observations in that 
cell, with shaded (blank) circles indicating the cells in which persons are overrepresented 
(underrepresented).17 
We find the joint distribution of top labour and capital incomes to differ substantially between 
men and women. Men are systematically overrepresented among the top 20 per cent of wage 
earners (across top capital income receivers) and the top 5 per cent of capital income receivers 
(across top earners), see Panel A. By contrast, women tend to be underrepresented in the top 
halves of the wage and capital income distribution, except between the 50th and 70th 
                                                     
16  See Atkinson et al (2018) who demonstrate that women are strongly under-represented in the distribution of 
total income. 
17  The circles’ areas in Panels A and B have been calculated as (percentage of observations in the given cell) - 
(1 / the number of cells)*(population share of males), and accordingly for women in Panels C and D.  
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percentiles of both labour and capital jointly (the top-left cells in Panel C) and the top 
percentile of the two distributions (the bottom-right cell in Panel D).  
Figure 3. Normalised simultaneous density of capital and wage income, 2004/5, by gender 
Men 
 Panel A: The top halves of both distributions Panel B: The top 5 per cent of both distributions 
  
 
Women 
 Panel C: The top halves of both distributions Panel D: The top 5 per cent of both distributions 
  
 
Note: The area of each circle is proportional to the frequency of observations in the specific cell. Shaded circles indicate 
cells in which persons are overrepresented; blank circles give those in which persons are underrepresented. 
 
The resulting survival functions, which we obtain again by aggregating from the top the 
simultaneous densities of wage and capital income separately for men and women, imply that 
women are underrepresented relative to men in the entire top half of the overall wage and 
capital income distribution. The share of taxpayers who are in the top half of both 
distributions is more than 13 percentage points lower for women than of men (Table 8), at 
19.3 per cent vs. 32.8 per cent, respectively. The size of this gap has significantly declined 
since 1995, however, by 2.6 percentage points (not shown). The underrepresentation of 
women relative to men tends to be systematically stronger for wage than for capital incomes: 
the below-diagonal values in Table 8 are virtually always larger than their above-diagonal 
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counterparts. In other words, the gender earnings gap at given levels of top capital incomes is 
larger than vice versa. 
Also the association between top labour and capital incomes is stronger for men than it is for 
women (Table 9). Among male taxpayers who were in the top 10 per cent of wage earners 
and in the top half of capital income receivers of the overall distribution in 2004/5, over one-
third were also in the top 10 per cent of capital income receivers (4.2 / 12.1 = 35 per cent); for 
women, the corresponding share was only about one-quarter (0.6 / 2.4 = 26 per cent). 
Similarly, of the top 10 per cent of capital income earners who were also in the top half of 
wage earners in the overall distribution, 41 per cent of male taxpayers were in the top 10 per 
cent of wage earners compared to only 22 per cent of female taxpayers. Note that we can no 
longer produce a figure with meaningful conditional survival functions, as done in Figure 2 
for the overall population. The reason is that the shares of men (and women) in the top 1 per 
cent of either the overall wage income distribution or the overall capital income distributions 
do not longer sum up to 1 per cent. They are moreover different for the top wage and capital 
income distributions.18 
5. Conclusion 
Public debates about rising top income shares often focus on the growing dispersion of wage 
incomes. Another potential driver is the growing dispersion of capital incomes. In this paper, 
we focused on a third mechanism, namely the changing association between wage and capital 
incomes. We have proposed extensions of the copula framework as tools for exploring the 
association between wage and capital income among top income earners, and illustrated its 
usefulness in examining the changing composition of top incomes in Norway between 1995 
and 2004/5.  
Top wage and capital incomes in Norway are clearly positively associated. Top wage income 
earners – such as executives or financial-sector employees – occupy virtually always also a 
high position in the capital income distribution: for example, of those in the top 1 per cent of 
wage income distribution, 91% were among the top half of capital income receivers, and over 
one-third (36 per cent) even among the top 5 per cent. The association between top wage and 
capital income is slightly asymmetric, however: the share of the 1 per cent of capital income 
earners who were also in the top half of the wage income distribution was somewhat lower, at 
79 per cent, and asymmetry that has become more pronounced over time. This is also 
                                                     
18  Specifically, 1.7 per cent of men are in the top 1 per cent of capital incomes while 1.9 per cent are in the top 1 
per cent of wage incomes. With 0.3 per cent of men being in the top 1 per cent of both distributions, the 
conditional probability of being in the top 1 per cent of labour income (capital income) for those in the top 1 
per cent of capital income (labour income) is 0.3 / 1.7 = 20.4 per cent (0.3 / 1.9 = 18.6 per cent). 
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consistent with the importance of capital incomes at the top of the income distribution in a 
number of Scandinavian countries, including Norway, as suggested in earlier research. 
The association between wage and capital incomes in the top half of the respective marginal 
distributions has generally grown stronger, hence contributing to increasing top income 
shares. An exception to this trend have been the top 1 per cent of capital income earners, who 
were much less likely to find themselves among top wage earners in 2004/5 than in 1995. One 
way of interpreting these results would be that of increasing class differentiation at the very 
top of the capital income distribution, with a growing class of “old-school capitalists” with 
little to no income from labour. Our gender decomposition of individual-level – which of 
course disregards any within-household resource sharing – demonstrates that the association 
of wage and capital incomes at the top is particularly striking for men, while women are 
largely under-represented in the top halves of the two marginal distributions.  
While a detailed policy analysis lies beyond the scope of this paper, the growing association 
between top wage and capital incomes is consistent with the development of top marginal tax 
rates. Today’s capital income is the return to a stock of wealth accumulated over earlier 
periods. Top marginal tax rates in Norway were gradually reduced in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, like elsewhere, thus allowing for increased savings and more wealth accumulation for 
high earners, and raising future capital incomes (Aaberge, Atkinson and Modalsli, 2013; 
Alvaredo et al., 2013).  
 
  
22 
References 
Aaberge, R, 2009, “Ranking intersecting Lorenz curves”, Social Choice and Welfare, Vol. 
33(2): 235-259. 
Aaberge, R and Atkinson, A B, 2010, “Top incomes in Norway” in A B Atkinson and T 
Piketty, editors, Top incomes: A global perspective, Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Aaberge, R, A B Atkinson and J Modalsli, 2013, “The ins and outs of top income mobility”, 
Discussion Paper No. 762, Statistics Norway. 
Aaberge, R, A. Bjørklund, M Jäntti, P J  Pedersen, N Smith and T Wennemo, 2000,  
"Unemployment Shocks and Income Distribution: How Did the Nordic Countries Fare 
During their Crises?", Scandinavian Journal of Economics, 102, 77-99. 
Alvaredo, F, A B Atkinson, T Piketty, and E Saez, 2013, “The Top 1 Percent in International 
and Historical Perspective”, Journal of Economic Perspectives, 27(3), 3-20. 
Arellano, M and S Bonhomme, 2017, “Quantile Selection Models with an Application to 
Understanding Changes in Wage Inequality”, Econometrica, 85(1), 1 – 28.  
Atkinson, A B, 1981, “The measurement of economic mobility” in P J Eijgelshoven and L J 
van Gemerden, editors, Inkomensverdeling en openbare financiën, Het Spectrum, Utrecht, 
reprinted in A B Atkinson, 1983, Social justice and public policy, Chapter 3, Wheatsheaf 
Books, Brighton. 
Atkinson, A B, 2007, “The distribution of top incomes in the United Kingdom 1908-2000” in 
A B Atkinson and T Piketty, editors, Top incomes over the twentieth century, Oxford 
University Press, Oxford. 
Atkinson, A B and Bourguignon, F, 1982, “The comparison of multi-dimensioned 
distributions of economic status”, Review of Economic Studies, Vol. 49(2): 183-201. 
Atkinson, A B and Lakner, C, 2017, “Capital and Labor: The Factor Income Composition of 
Top Incomes in the United States, 1962-2006”. World Bank Policy Research Working 
Paper, No. 8268.  
Atkinson, A B, A Cassarico and S Voitchovsky, 2018, “Top  Incomes  and the Gender 
Divide”, Journal of Economic Inequality (to appear). 
Boland, P J and F Prochan, 1988, “Multivariate Arrangement Increasing Functions with 
Applications in Probability and Statistics,” Journal of Multivariate Analysis, 25, 286 – 
298. 
23 
Bonhomme, S, J-M Robin, 2006, “Modelling Individual Earnings Trajectories Using 
Copulas: France 1990 – 2002”, Chapter 18 in Contributions to Economic Analysis, Vol. 
275: Structural Models of Wage and Employment Dynamics, ed. H. Bunzel, B. 
Christensen, G. Neumann, and J.-M. Robin, Amsterdam:Elsevier. 
Bonhomme, S, J-M Robin, 2009, “Assessing the Equalizing Force of Mobility Using Short 
Panels: France 1990 – 2000”, The Review of Economic Studies, 76, 63-92.  
Dardanoni, V and P Lambert, 2001, “Horizontal inequity comparisons”, Social Choice and 
Welfare, Vol 18(4): 799-816. 
Decancq, K, 2012, “Elementary Multivariate Rearrangements and Stochastic Dominance on a 
Fréchet class”, Journal of Economic Theory,  147(4), 1450-1459. 
Decancq, K, 2014, “Copula-based Measurement of Dependence between Dimensions of 
Well-being”, Oxford Economic Papers, 66, 681-701. 
García-Peñalosa, C and E Orgiazzi, 2013, “Factor Components of Inequality: A Cross-
Country Study”, Review of Income and Wealth, 59(4). 
Gollin, D, 2002, “Getting Income Shares Right”, Journal of Political Economy, 110(2), 458-
474. 
Jäntti, M, M Riihelä, R Sullström and M Tuomala, 2010, “Trends in Top Income Shares in 
Finland” in A B Atkinson and T Piketty, editors, Top incomes: A global perspective, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford.  
Johnson, D G, 1954, “The Functional Distribution of Income in the United States, 1850-
1952”, The Review of Economics and Statistics, 36(2), 175-182. 
Jäntti, M, E M Sierminska and P Van Kerm, 2015, “Modelling the Joint Distribution of 
Income and Wealth”, in Measurement of Poverty, Deprivation and Economic Modelling, 
Emerald Group Publishing Limited, 301-327. 
Milanovic, B, 2017, “Increasing Capital Income Share and Its Effect on Personal Income 
Inequality” in H Boushey, J B DeLong and M Steinbaum, editors, After Piketty: The 
Agenda for Economics and Inequality, Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 
Nelsen, R B, 2006, An introduction to Copulas, Second Edition, Springer  Series  in  
Statistics.. 
Piketty, T and Saez, E, 2003, “Income inequality in the United States, 1913-1998”, Quarterly 
Journal of Economics, Vol. 118, No.1: 1-39. 
24 
Piketty, T and Saez, E, 2007, “Income and wage inequality in the United Kingdom 1913-
2002” in A B Atkinson and T Piketty, editors, Top incomes over the twentieth century, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford. 
Piketty, T, E Saez and G Zucman, 2018, “Distributional National Accounts: Methods and 
Estimates for the United States”, The Quarterly Journal of Economics. 
Roine, J and D Waldenström, 2008, “The Evolution of Top Incomes in an Egalitarian Society: 
Sweden, 1903–2004”, Journal of Public Economics, 92(1–2), 366–387, 
Schweizer, B and Wolff, E F, 1981, “On nonparametric measures of dependence for random 
variables”, Annals of Statistics, Vol. 9, No. 4: 879-885. 
Tchen, A H, 1980, “Inequality for Distributions with Given Marginals”, Annals of 
Probability, 8, 814-827. 
Wolff, E N and Zacharias, A, 2009, “Household wealth and the measurement of economic 
well-being in the United States”, Journal of Economic Inequality, Vol. 7(2): 83-115. 
 
Ta
bl
e 
1.
 S
im
ul
ta
ne
ou
s d
en
sit
y 
of
 ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e i
nc
om
e 2
00
4/
5 
(fr
eq
ue
nc
ie
s i
n 
pe
r 
ce
nt
) 
 
C
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
U
p 
to
 P
50
 
P5
0-
P5
9 
P6
0-
P7
9 
P8
0-
P8
9 
P9
0-
P9
4 
P9
5-
P9
9 
P9
9-
P9
9.
5 
P9
9.
5-
P1
00
 
TO
TA
L 
U
p 
to
 P
50
 
27
.6
3 
4.
62
 
10
.1
6 
4.
85
 
1.
90
 
0.
64
 
0.
10
 
0.
11
 
50
 
P5
0-
P5
9 
6.
16
 
0.
98
 
1.
44
 
0.
64
 
0.
47
 
0.
27
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
10
 
P6
0-
P7
9 
9.
89
 
2.
15
 
3.
60
 
1.
87
 
1.
24
 
1.
08
 
0.
09
 
0.
08
 
20
 
P8
0-
P8
9 
3.
95
 
1.
17
 
2.
20
 
1.
11
 
0.
64
 
0.
77
 
0.
08
 
0.
07
 
10
 
P9
0-
P9
4 
1.
49
 
0.
59
 
1.
29
 
0.
69
 
0.
34
 
0.
49
 
0.
06
 
0.
05
 
5 
P9
5-
P9
9 
0.
78
 
0.
42
 
1.
10
 
0.
67
 
0.
32
 
0.
56
 
0.
08
 
0.
08
 
4 
P9
9-
P9
9.
5 
0.
05
 
0.
04
 
0.
13
 
0.
09
 
0.
05
 
0.
10
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
0.
5 
P9
9.
5-
P1
00
 
0.
04
 
0.
02
 
0.
09
 
0.
09
 
0.
04
 
0.
09
 
0.
06
 
0.
07
 
0.
5 
TO
TA
L 
50
 
10
 
20
 
10
 
5 
4 
0.
5 
0.
5 
10
0 
No
te
: T
he
 n
um
be
rs
 m
ay
 n
ot
 a
dd
 u
p 
ex
ac
tly
 o
n 
ac
co
un
t o
f r
ou
nd
in
g.
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 2
7.
63
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
bo
tto
m
 h
al
f o
f t
he
 w
ag
e 
an
d 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
ns
. I
n 
ot
he
r w
or
ds
, o
f t
ho
se
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
ho
 
w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
bo
tto
m
 h
al
f o
f w
ag
es
, 5
5.
26
 p
er
 c
en
t w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
bo
tto
m
 h
al
f o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
. 
  
25 
26 
Ta
bl
e 
2.
 S
ur
vi
va
l f
un
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e i
nc
om
e 
20
04
/5
 (f
re
qu
en
ci
es
 in
 p
er
 c
en
t) 
 
C
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
ha
lf 
27
.6
3 
22
.2
6 
12
.4
1 
7.
26
 
4.
15
 
0.
79
 
0.
39
 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
23
.7
9 
19
.4
0 
11
.0
0 
6.
48
 
3.
85
 
0.
75
 
0.
37
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
13
.6
8 
11
.4
4 
6.
64
 
3.
99
 
2.
59
 
0.
58
 
0.
29
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
7.
63
 
6.
56
 
3.
96
 
2.
42
 
1.
67
 
0.
43
 
0.
22
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
4.
13
 
3.
64
 
2.
33
 
1.
47
 
1.
07
 
0.
32
 
0.
16
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
91
 
0.
85
 
0.
63
 
0.
45
 
0.
36
 
0.
16
 
0.
08
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
46
 
0.
44
 
0.
35
 
0.
26
 
0.
22
 
0.
12
 
0.
07
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 0
.2
6 
pe
r c
en
t o
f h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f w
ag
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
to
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
. T
ha
t i
s, 
52
 
(=
10
0*
0.
00
26
/0
.0
05
) p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
ho
se
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
ho
 w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 w
ag
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
w
er
e 
al
so
 in
 th
e 
to
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
he
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n.
 
 Ta
bl
e 
3.
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 su
rv
iv
al
 fu
nc
tio
n 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
20
04
/5
 co
m
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 1
99
5 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
) 
 
C
ap
ita
l 
in
co
m
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
1.
19
 
1.
07
 
0.
77
 
0.
21
 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
5 
-0
.0
2 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
1.
06
 
1.
10
 
0.
87
 
0.
30
 
0.
04
 
-0
.0
6 
-0
.0
3 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
0.
59
 
0.
78
 
0.
74
 
0.
33
 
0.
13
 
-0
.1
2 
-0
.0
5 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
0.
35
 
0.
47
 
0.
44
 
0.
19
 
0.
10
 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.0
7 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
20
 
0.
25
 
0.
23
 
0.
08
 
0.
04
 
-0
.1
5 
-0
.0
8 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
05
 
0.
05
 
0.
05
 
0.
01
 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
7 
-0
.0
7 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
02
 
0.
03
 
0.
02
 
0.
00
 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
3 
-0
.0
5 
No
te
: T
he
 sh
ad
in
g 
sh
ow
s t
he
 c
el
ls 
w
ho
se
 si
ze
 d
ec
lin
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
19
95
 a
nd
 2
00
4/
5.
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 In
 2
00
4/
5,
 0
.0
3 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s f
ew
er
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f w
ag
es
, 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 1
99
5.
 
27 
Ta
bl
e 
4.
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Sp
ea
rm
an
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f w
ag
e-
ca
pi
ta
l f
or
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s i
n 
19
95
 a
nd
 2
00
4/
5 
 
 
 
C
ap
ita
l 
 
 
 
Lo
w
er
 h
al
f 
U
pp
er
 h
al
f 
W
ag
e 
Lo
w
er
 h
al
f 
19
95
 
 .2
06
 
-.1
64
 
20
04
/5
 
 .2
30
 
-.1
54
 
U
pp
er
 h
al
f 
19
95
 
-.1
17
 
 .2
43
 
20
04
/5
 
-.1
03
 
 .2
60
 
 Ta
bl
e 
5.
 S
ur
vi
va
l f
un
ct
io
n 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e i
nc
om
e f
or
 tw
o-
pe
rs
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s, 
20
04
/5
 (f
re
qu
en
ci
es
 in
 p
er
 c
en
t) 
 
C
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
To
p 
ha
lf 
26
.1
3 
20
.5
6 
10
.6
9 
6.
05
 
3.
95
 
0.
74
 
0.
37
 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
21
.9
9 
17
.4
5 
9.
18
 
5.
16
 
3.
49
 
0.
70
 
0.
35
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
12
.7
3 
10
.4
8 
5.
91
 
3.
43
 
2.
37
 
0.
56
 
0.
28
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
7.
16
 
6.
08
 
3.
68
 
2.
25
 
1.
61
 
0.
43
 
0.
22
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
3.
91
 
3.
42
 
2.
20
 
1.
40
 
1.
03
 
0.
32
 
0.
17
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
88
 
0.
81
 
0.
60
 
0.
43
 
0.
34
 
0.
17
 
0.
09
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
45
 
0.
42
 
0.
33
 
0.
25
 
0.
21
 
0.
13
 
0.
07
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 0
.2
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
w
o-
pe
rs
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f w
ag
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
to
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
. T
ha
t i
s, 
50
 
(=
10
0*
0.
00
25
/0
.0
05
) p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
ho
se
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
ho
 w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f t
he
 w
ag
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
w
er
e 
al
so
 in
 th
e 
to
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f t
he
 
ca
pi
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n.
 
 
28 
Ta
bl
e 
6.
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 su
rv
iv
al
 fu
nc
tio
n 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e 
in
co
m
e f
or
 tw
o-
pe
rs
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s, 
20
04
/5
 c
om
pa
re
d 
w
ith
 1
99
5 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
) 
 
C
ap
ita
l 
in
co
m
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
0.
48
 
0.
55
 
0.
59
 
0.
11
 
-0
.2
1 
-0
.0
8 
-0
.0
4 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
0.
66
 
0.
83
 
0.
99
 
0.
52
 
0.
23
 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
4 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
0.
61
 
0.
73
 
0.
79
 
0.
43
 
0.
26
 
-0
.1
4 
-0
.0
7 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
0.
41
 
0.
45
 
0.
44
 
0.
20
 
0.
14
 
-0
.1
9 
-0
.0
9 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
24
 
0.
25
 
0.
22
 
0.
08
 
0.
05
 
-0
.2
0 
-0
.0
9 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
05
 
0.
04
 
0.
03
 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
2 
-0
.0
9 
-0
.0
8 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
03
 
0.
02
 
0.
02
 
0.
00
 
-0
.0
1 
-0
.0
4 
-0
.0
6 
No
te
: T
he
 sh
ad
in
g 
sh
ow
s t
he
 c
el
ls
 w
ho
se
 si
ze
 d
ec
lin
ed
 b
et
w
ee
n 
19
95
 a
nd
 2
00
4/
5.
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 In
 2
00
4/
5,
 0
.0
4 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s f
ew
er
 tw
o-
pe
rs
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
to
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f 
w
ag
es
, c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 1
99
5.
 
 Ta
bl
e 
7.
 D
ec
om
po
sit
io
n 
of
 th
e 
Sp
ea
rm
an
 c
oe
ffi
ci
en
t o
f w
ag
e-
ca
pi
ta
l f
or
 tw
o-
pe
rs
on
 h
ou
se
ho
ld
s i
n 
19
95
 a
nd
 2
00
4/
5 
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
C
ap
ita
l 
   W
ag
e 
 
 
Lo
w
er
 h
al
f 
U
pp
er
 h
al
f 
Lo
w
er
 h
al
f 
19
95
 
 .2
27
 
-.1
72
 
20
04
/5
 
 .2
24
 
-.1
71
 
U
pp
er
 h
al
f 
19
95
 
-.1
35
 
 .2
15
 
20
04
/5
 
-.1
30
 
 .2
32
 
 
29 
Ta
bl
e 
8.
 D
iff
er
en
ce
 in
 su
rv
iv
al
 fu
nc
tio
n 
fo
r 
ca
pi
ta
l a
nd
 w
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
N
or
w
ay
 m
en
 co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 w
om
en
, 2
00
4/
5 
(in
 p
er
ce
nt
ag
e 
po
in
ts
) 
 
C
ap
ita
l 
in
co
m
e 
 
 
 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r 
ce
nt
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
13
.4
2 
12
.4
8 
9.
93
 
7.
25
 
5.
26
 
1.
14
 
0.
58
 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
15
.2
0 
13
.2
6 
9.
29
 
6.
29
 
4.
55
 
1.
10
 
0.
56
 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
13
.9
1 
11
.7
6 
7.
47
 
4.
75
 
3.
30
 
0.
96
 
0.
49
 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
9.
66
 
8.
28
 
5.
33
 
3.
40
 
2.
36
 
0.
77
 
0.
40
 
To
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
5.
80
 
5.
09
 
3.
42
 
2.
24
 
1.
60
 
0.
59
 
0.
31
 
To
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t 
1.
46
 
1.
35
 
1.
03
 
0.
74
 
0.
57
 
0.
30
 
0.
16
 
To
p 
0.
5 
pe
r c
en
t 
0.
77
 
0.
72
 
0.
58
 
0.
43
 
0.
35
 
0.
22
 
0.
12
 
No
te
: R
es
ul
ts 
ar
e 
fo
r t
he
 p
er
so
ns
 a
ge
d 
25
 y
ea
rs
 a
nd
 o
ve
r. 
Re
ad
in
g:
 In
 2
00
4/
5,
 0
.5
7 
pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 p
oi
nt
s f
ew
er
 fe
m
al
e 
th
an
 m
al
e 
ta
xp
ay
er
s w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
5 
pe
r c
en
t o
f c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
es
 a
nd
 th
e 
to
p 
1 
pe
r c
en
t o
f 
w
ag
es
. 
 Ta
bl
e 
9.
 S
ur
vi
va
l f
un
ct
io
n 
of
 to
p 
ea
rn
ed
 in
co
m
e f
or
 v
ar
io
us
 g
ro
up
s o
f t
op
 ca
pi
ta
l i
nc
om
e r
ec
ei
ve
rs
 (a
nd
 v
ic
e v
er
sa
): 
m
en
 (a
nd
 w
om
en
 in
 
br
ac
ke
ts
), 
20
04
/5
 (f
re
qu
en
ci
es
 in
 p
er
 ce
nt
) 
 
C
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
e 
 
 
 
W
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
To
p 
ha
lf 
To
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t 
4.
2 
(0
.6
) 
6.
6 
(1
.1
) 
10
.4
 (2
.0
) 
12
.1
 (2
.4
) 
To
p 
20
 p
er
 c
en
t 
6.
1 
(1
.1
) 
 
 
 
To
p 
40
 p
er
 c
en
t 
8.
6 
(2
.1
) 
 
 
 
To
p 
ha
lf 
10
.2
 (2
.8
) 
 
 
 
Re
ad
in
g:
 1
0.
2 
pe
r c
en
t o
f m
en
 a
nd
 2
.8
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f w
om
en
 w
er
e 
in
 th
e 
to
p 
ha
lf 
of
 th
e 
ov
er
al
l w
ag
e 
in
co
m
e 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
to
p 
10
 p
er
 c
en
t o
f 
ov
er
al
l c
ap
ita
l i
nc
om
e.
  
30 
Appendix A.1 – The treatment of self-employment income 
In our standard analysis, we allocate self-employment income to labour and capital income in 
shares two-thirds and one-third. While this choice is largely uncontroversial when looking at 
aggregate income shares, it seems admittedly more ad hoc when studying the distribution of 
households’ or individuals’ incomes. In this appendix, we therefore provide some further 
details on the joint distribution of capital and self-employment incomes, and illustrate the 
impact of our results of simply ignoring income from self-employment.  
Top capital and self-employment income shares are somewhat less strongly associated than 
those for capital and wage income. This can be seen in Table A.1.1, where we compare the 
survival probabilities for the top income shares of capital and self-employment and capital and 
wage income. More specifically, the table gives the ratio of the joint survival probabilities – 
in these calculations, we no longer attribute income from self-employment to capital and 
wage income. Most of the values in Table A.1.1 are lower than unity – this means that the cell 
sizes are smaller for the top capital and self-employment income shares than for the top capital 
and wage income shares. Especially the top 1 per cent of capital income earners are more 
likely to be also among the top wage earners than among the top self-employment income 
receivers.  
Since having high income from self-employment is positively associated with having high 
capital income, our decision to attribute self-employment income to capital and wage income 
rather than to ignore it in our analysis led to a boost in the association of top capital and wage 
incomes. Table A.1.2 illustrates that the share of households in the top 1 per cent of both 
capital and wage income that we have calculated is more than twice as high as it would be 
had we simply ignored income from self-employment. In other words, the association in top 
wage and capital income shares that we found was reinforced by the positive relationship 
between being in top part of these income distributions and having high income from self-
employment.  
Our time trend of a strengthening association of top capital and wage incomes is however not 
heavily affected by our decision to allocate income from self-employment to capital and 
wages. The observed difference in survival functions for top capital and wage incomes 
between 1995 and 2004/5 looks very similar if we ignore income from self-employment 
(Table A.1.3). As in our standard analysis (Table 3), we find a strengthening in the 
association of top capital and wage incomes over time except for the top 1 per cent of capital 
income earners – in fact, the strengthening becomes more visible once self-employment 
income is ignored.  
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Appendix A.2 – A decomposition by age 
Another way of decomposing the joint distribution of labour and capital incomes is to look at the 
contributions of the different age groups. Figure A.2.1 shows the survival copulas for the top 10 per 
cent of wage earners and capital income receivers, “sliced” for the top half of the capital and wage 
income distribution, respectively. Taxpayers in their late 40s to 50s are most strongly represented in 
the top 10 per cent capital and wage income earners; persons above 70 are essentially not represented, 
since they typically do not make it into the upper half of the wage income distribution.  
Figure A.2.1. Survival functions for capital and wage income, by age, 2004/5 
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